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NOTES AND COMMENT
Corporate Practice of Law.
An interesting question, and one of practical importance, is that of
corporate practice of law. It is well settled, at least outside of Wisconsin, (no case having thus far been decided in Wisconsin) that a corporation may not practice law; and almost, if not equally well settled
what constitutes such practice. In re Otterness (---- Minn ----- 232
N.W. 318) clearly shows the attitude of the courts toward corporations
that attempt to practice law. In this recent case the defendant, a
licensed attorney, was employed by a banking corporation as vice president, at a certain salary; and by the terms of the employment contract,
the defendant was to practice law as he had before, in addition to performing his other duties at the bank. It was further agreed that all
attorney's fees earned by him should be turned over to the bank, as
income of the bank, and to become its property. Pursuant to this contract, as the referee found, defendant foreclosed a number of mortgages, some owned by the bank, and some owned by other parties.
Defendant also conducted probate proceedings, in addition to performing other legal services. This participation in foreclosure and probate
proceedings was held, by the court, to be practice of law.
In all cases handled by him, the defendant collected regular attorney's fees which he turned over to the bank. This, the court held, was
practice of law by a corporation, since the banking corporation hired
defendant to practice law, for its own profit. Thus the test of improper
practice of law as laid down by this court is whether the employer
(corporation or layman) hires an attorney for the employer's profit. It
is obvious, of course, that it is not improper to hire an attorney to
handle the employer's cases so long as the fees charged by the attorney
do not exceed the salary paid to him, thus resulting in a profit for the
employer. Any such profit earning arrangement between corporation
and attorney constitutes misconduct, and is generally punished by disbarment or suspension. However, in the instant case, since the employment contract had terminated, and since defendant had a good reputation as an attorney, the court merely censured him for participating
in the practice of law by a corporation.
Other cases are in harmony with this Minnesota case: In re Eastern
Idaho Loan and Trust Co., et al. (---- Idaho ___ 288 Pac. 157)
holds that an advertisement by defendant corporation that it was a
specialist in the drawing of trust agreements, wills, and the like, was
holding out as qualified to practice law, thus coming within the statutory prohibition. This case draws the distinction, however, between
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the mere clerical filling in of a skeleton form, and the drawing of an
instrument which is to be formed from a body of facts and which involves the determination of the legal effect of the instrument. The
result of the distinction is clear: the corporation may perform the
clerical work of filling in forms; but may not do that which requires
special legal skill, as, e. g., the drawing of trust agreements and wills.
An early case Eley v. Miller; 7 Ind. App. 529) lays down the general principal that practice law, in its larger sense, includes legal advice
and counsel, as, e, g., the preparation of legal instruments by which
legal rights are secured, as well as the performance of services in a
court of justice. The same result was reached in a later case, where
it was held that practice of law is not only services in a court of justice,
but includes drafting and supervising execution of wills. (People v.
People's Trust Co.; 180 N.Y. App. Div. 494).
The cases, though not numerous, are unanimous on the principle
that a corporation cannot practice law, because "the practice of law is
not a business that is open to a commercial 6orporation." (State v.
Mllerchants Protective Corp.; 105 Wash. 12).
WESLEY KuSWA.

Taxation: Corporations.
Judgment for the defendants in Palmolive Co. v. Conway, 43 Fed.
(2nd) 226, was handed down August 6, 1930. The plaintiff sought
to enjoin the state tax commission and the county treasurer from collecting certain state income taxes assessed for the years 1924, 1925,
and 1926, on the ground that such assessments are illegal under the
Wisconsin law and that collection thereof would violate the rights of
the plaintiff under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Palmolive Company of Wisconsin had existed in Milwaukee for
30 years. In 1923 the officers of that company organized as a Delaware corporation later known as Palmolive-Peet-Colgate Co. This corporation is hereinafter designated as the parent company. The same
interests during the same year, also in Delaware, caused to be incorporated the Western Operating Company. This company is the plaintiff. The parent company acquired all of the capital stock of the Wisconsin Company, then purchased from it all of its assets located out
of the state, consisting of real estate, warehouses, offices, merchandise,
accounts receivable, goodwill, trade marks, and trade secrets, paying
to the Wisconsin company a part of its own stock. Then the parent
company sold to the plaintiff the remainder of the stock in exchange
for all the capital stock of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then bought from
the Wisconsin company the Milwaukee plant in exchange for part of
the stock it received from the parent company. Plaintiff then held what

